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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
In November 1974, Plaintiff filed suit in the
District Court of Iron County, Utah, for "specific performance" of a purported 1970 "agreement for exchange"
of desert grazing land acquired by Plaintiff and his wife
in May 1970, for State Normal School trust-fund land on
SUIIllllit Mountain; but at the time of trial on April 5, 1978,
the Court urged the parties to recess and to work out a
settlement agreement.

They did and an Exchange Agreement

dated June 2, 1978 resulted.

Thereafter, the legal and

factual disputes arose concerning that agreement.

The

basic issue tried on April 30, 1979 was whether each tract
had been appraised for its highest and best use market
value, and whether the appraisal was or was not otherwise
adequate to meet' the terms of said agreement.
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN THE DISTRICT COURT
On September 6, 1978, Defendants filed a Motion to
have the conditional Exchange Agreement dated June 2, 1978,
adjudged null and void (a) for failure to have the State
trust-fund land appraised for its highest and best use
market value;

(b) also by reason of material errors of fact

in the appraisal report of Ken w. Esplin dated May 26, 197 8·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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which would allow Plaintiff to be unjustly enriched by
acquiring State trust-fund land without adequate consideration; and (c) on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to
perform as required.
On September 15, 1978, Plaintiff's counsel filed
a Counter-Motion for an Order to Compel the State of Utah
to convey title to the State land, to which Motion the
Attorney General served objections and also denials of
Plaintiff's Affidavit on September 25, 1978,
After a trial on April 30, 1979 before Honorable
J. Harlan Burns, District Court Judge, at Parowan, Utah,
the Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Defendants to convey
title to the State land, was granted and the Motion of
Defendants was denied.
NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants-Appellants seek reversal of the District
Court judgment whereby the State of Utah was required to
convey to Plaintiff and to his wife the State land described
in said judgment, and to remand the case to the District

Court for the purpose of having the court ascertain the
relative values of the subject properties in order to carry
out the intent of the parties unless Plaintiff then elects
to dismiss this cause.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Plaintiff and his wife acquired in May 1970 a
tract of desert land in western Iron County, Utah described
as Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and S 1/2 N l,/2 of Section 1, T. 33 s.,
R. 19

w.,

SLM, (329 acresj, hereinafter referred to as

Parcel No. 1, which Plaintiff orally offered in exchange
for State trust fund land on Summit Mountain, described
as NW 1/4 and W 1/2 NE 1/4 of Section 33, T. 35 S., R.
9

w.,

SLM, in Iron County, Utah (240 acres}, hereinafter

referred to as Parcel No. 2.

Plaintiff alleged that the

Department of Natural Resources on June 5, 1970, "approved"
an exchange subject to recommendation of the Attorney
General that after examination of abstract o£ title, Plaintiff was found to have a marketable title.

(Doc. U}.

For reasons not now relevant, Defendants refused
to carry out the alleged agreement and this suit was the
result.

It was filed on November 11, 1974,
In settlement of the suit, the parties entered

into the Exchange Agreement dated June 2, 1978.

Pursuant

thereto, the appraiser referred to therein, one Ken W. Esplin
appraised the properties and his appraisal dated May 26, 197!
was received in evidence over Defendants' objections as Exhibit "7A."

The facts which form the basis of Defendants'

objections to said appraisal will be set forth in the course
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-3may contain errors.

of the argument and will not be set forth here to avoid
duplication since it is sufficient at this time to note
that Defendants objected to said appraisal on the same
grounds in the trial court that they do here in this appeal.
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VALUE
OF THE STATE LAND WAS THE VALUE STATED IN
THE ESPLIN APPRAISAL.
The Esplin appraisal was so grossly inadequate that
it could not properly support the court's finding of value
because (1) it was based on facts admittedly erroneous as
to the existence of both water and water rights on the State
property; (2) it treated the State land as landlocked, even
though it acknowledged the existence of a platted subdivision;
(3) it failed to consider comparable sales because of the rnisunderstanding of the physical characteristics of the State
property as to water and access referred to above.

Also, the

appraiser believed the Gardner sales (some of the comparables)
were

~

water when in fact they were not.

While the parties had agreed that the exchange of
Plaintiff's land for State land should be made, it was clear
that the basis of valuation of the two tracts of land should
be made on the basis of the highest and best use of each
tract.

[Transcript April 5, 1978, p. 19, (R. 15, p. 19)].
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Although the Esplin appraisal (R. 17) stated that
II

There is also a subdivision adjacent to the east side

of Parcel No. 2 [i.e. State land] that has had some activity,,
the subdivision has a fairly good spring that is for the
use of the property owners. " (p. 5} and that

1
'.

•

•

Parcel

No. 2 is completely dry and has no possibility of getting
water at the present time.

11

(p. 6)

The evidence was clear

that the State property had a spring with a flow of water
which varied somewhat, but that it never dried up.
Plaintiff admitted on cross-examination (Transcript
April 30, 1979, R. 29 pp. 49-50, 52-54, 57} that he was awan,
of the water on the State land.

Crystal testifie_d (R. 29, pp

82-83) that in the fall when he was on the State land there
was a flow of about 15 gallons per minute and there was prett,
much permanent water on the property.

Halterman testified

(R. 29, pp. 113-117) that he was familiar with the State prof
erty and that on the average the flow was 100-l75 gallons per,
minute and that he had never seen the lake dry.

Finally,

Gardner, one of the owners of the subdivided tract referred
to in the Esplin appraisal, testified (R. 29, p. 120} that sa:.
of lots or small tracts were made to the buyers without wate:
rights.
Some confusion may have existed in the court 1 s mind'
to the importance of the water.

The State 1 s attorney sought

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to explain that the State had acquired title to the land
in 1901 and had a diligence right to the water since title
predated 1903 (R. 29, p. 150).
THE COURT: Is there anything in the agreement that would include water?
MR. REIMANN: The agreement specified it had
to be appraised for its highest and best use, and
that would automatically include water rights.
THE COURT:

It would?

MR. REIMANN:

Yes.

THE COURT: In other words, am I to understand that in trading property with the State of Utah,
this witness, the plaintiff, would receive water?
Don't you have to file on water and prove up on your
claim? Doesn't all the water in the State of Utah
belong to the State subject to appropriation?
MR. REIMANN: Yes. But under the statute,
your Honor, if the State had given a deed to this
property or a patent, as they ask, it would carry
all appurtenant water rights. And that's why it's
important when it comes to the determination of value.
That's why it's important. So we'd like to offer in
evidence Plaintiff's Exhibit 13-A.
MR. PARK:

We object, your Honor.

THE COURT: I am going to overrule your objection, and receive it for what weight it has.
I don't understand the law, Mr. Reimann, to be to
the effect that you say it is. That if the State
trades land to a private individual, that he gets
the water; I don't know that's right. I would
understand the law to be to the effect that he
must file and appropriate under the State Engineer's
auspices that may be subject to appropriation. That's
the way I would understand the law.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13-A received in evidence.)
THE COURT: All right, next question. Mr. Park,
you are on your feet, do you have something?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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MR. PARK: Well, we object to the questions
concerning water as being irrelevant, your Honor.
In the agreement, it says, that we get the land,
but it doesn't say whether we are getting water
or not getting water.
It wasn't communicated to
the appraiser whether we were getting water or not.
And whether we get i t or not is going to be a determination that would have to be -THE COURT:

MR. PARK:

So you object to it?
Yes, Sir.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Reimann wants
to give you water, and you object to it?

MR. PARK;

No, Sir.

THE COURT:
I am going to sustain the objection. I am going to sustain your objection.
Let me ask you this, does your statement bind the
State Engineer's office?
MR. REIMANN: Oh, yes, because the State
Engineer takes everything -- he's bound by the
statutes.
In response to questions from Plaintiff's attorney,
Crystal explained what a diligence claim is, and explained
the process necessary to a change of use from livestock water,
ing to domestic use.

(R. 29, pp. 105-107)

A discussion then

followed which led the court to state (p. 108):
THE COURT: No use wasting time on that;
the State of Utah owns all the water in this State,
and people have a right to use i t as determined by
the State Engineer's office • .
It is obvious that whether or not a tract of land in
Utah or any other arid western state has water or the abilitY
to secure water is extremely important to the determinationo
its value for almost any conceivable use.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A further reading of the Esplin appraisal (p. 9)
shows that while Esplin was aware of sales or lots or small
tracts of the "Gardner" subdivision at " • • • upwards of
$1,000 per acre . • • " and that the Gardner tract "

all accessible

is

, " he treated such sales as not com-

parable to the state property.

" • • • Parcel No. 2 [i.e.

State land] is very inferior to the sale adjacent to it,
having no more than one-third of the property presently
usable for speculative purposes and with no water and no
apparent possibility of getting water."

(Emphasis added.)

It must be assumed that Esplin either did not know
or did not understand that the Gardner tracts were sold
without water rights.

It is also rather obvious that Esplin

felt that water availability was a necessary preliminary to
sale of lots or small tracts.
Additionally, the Esplin appraisal would indicate
that there is no road access to the State tract, although
the existence of a platted subdivision street is acknowledged,
(p.

6).

While Gardner was not familiar with the water on the
adjoining State land (R. 29, p. 121), he was familiar with
the State property since 1963, and stated (p. 122) that part
of the State property would be very similar to the property
this group acquired.

Some of the property acquired by Gardner

was rather steep and similar to part of the State land.

There

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was a dedicated fifty-foot road to the State property
since 1971 as required by the County Commission.

There

were no subdivision improvements on the Gardner property
except some rough-cut roads,

(p. 124), and except for the

extreme southeast part, cutting the roads was just a matter
of pushing over some trees,

(p. 125).

In response to questions by the Plaintiff's attorney and by the court (pp. 128, 129), Gardner testified
that a platted roadway crossed his property [i.e., between
the State property and the County road] and that the trees
had been pushed over, that it was a road like others in the
subdivision, but the fence into the State property hadn't
been let down because nobody wanted it done at the time.
It is also clear that Plaintiff was aware of the
dedicated fifty-foot road.

Plaintiff owned land adjoining

the State land (R. 29, p. 34), and was aware that land adjoining the State land had been purchased in 1963 or 1964

for development of summer home sites (p. 38) , knew that Elm£
Lowe had offered $100.00 an acre for the State's 240 acres
in 1970 (pp. 39, 40), was a County Commissioner when the
County required Gardner to dedicate the road (p. 43), and
knew that the road had been dedicated on the date the Esplir
appraisal was made,

(p. 48, 49).

It further appears that the Plaintiff went to the
State property with Esplin at the time when Esplin made his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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appraisal (R. 29, pp. 56, 57).

It would appear that Plain-

tiff failed to communicate the knowledge he had of the State
property to Esplin.
It may be that the court understood the problem to
be that the State wished to draw into question the integrity
of Esplin or the Plaintiff, (R. 24, p.4).

The objection to

the Esplin appraisal is that at least three important factors,
water, access and comparable sales, were misunderstood by
Esplin and the result was an inadequate or mistaken conclusion,
namely, that all of the State property was without water or
the possibility of water, without access to the County road
as a practical matter, and useful only for grazing.
It is noteworthy that the court seemed to think that
the State should have " • . • to cross-examine Mr. Ken Esplin
and examine him as thoroughly as you want to, also for purposes of impeaching your own selected appraiser ••
24, p. 4)

n

(R.

The court, prior to its ruling, also commented

that Esplin was in court but neither party called him, (R.
25, p. 139).

The court found nothing in the testimony lead-

ing it to believe that Esplin had made his appraisal other
than in accordance with the standards required by a land appraiser.

(R. 25, p. 140)

The court treated the Crystal ap-

praisal as simply a different opinion as to highest and best
use.

It is respectfully submitted that the court ignored

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the facts while deciding that Esplin's integrity was
above reproach.
While the State acknowledges that this court does
not sit to weigh evidence, it is respectfully submitted
that the evidence in this case shows conclusively that
the Esplin appraisal, and the trial court's findings based
on that appraisal, are simply unsupportable.
The Crystal appraisal (Exhibit 15 A) fairly described 100 of the State's 240 acres as comparable to the
Gardner property, described water on the State land, determined the fact that the Gardner tract sales were without
water rights, noted the need to regrade the dedicated road
across the Gardner property, and properly compared actual
sales of like property.

Crystal also concluded that 140

State acres had a present value only for grazing.

No testi·

mony was adduced· to contradict the Crystal judgment of valu:
The Crystal appraisal and the testimony of the wit·
nesses made it clear that Esplin did not know the facts.
His opinion as to value cannot stand.
POINT II
THE ESPLIN APPRAISAL WAS INADEQUATE AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
In determining the fair cash market value of land,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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there should be taken into account all considerations
that might fairly be brought forward and reasonably be
given substantial weight in negotiations between the owner
and a prospective purchaser.!/

While each parcel of real

estate may be unique because of exclusive physical location
upon the earth's surface, the test is whether there is
reasonable comparability between the tracts.

The ter.m

"comparable" or "similar" cannot mean "identical," but
if there is a reasonable basis for comparison between properties, evidence of sales is admissible.~
Without undue repetition of the statements made
in Point I, it is obvious that "comparables" of the State

property and the Gardner property were either unknown to
or missed by Mr. Esplin.

Since Mr. Esplin did not testify,

the court had only the appraisal report.'

In view of the

other testimony, it is quite clear that Mr. Esplin treated
the Gardner property and sales reflecting value improperly.
Most courts have held that comparable sales are the
best evidence of value.lf

Such evidence can be given directly

State Highway Commission v. Superbuilt Mfg. Co., 204
Ore. 393, 281 P.2d 707 ll955).
~/

State v. Peek, 1 Ut.2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 ll953); ~
Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Ut.2d 317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969);
City of Evanston v. Piotrowitz, 20 Ill.2d 512, 170 N.E.2d
569 (1960).
United States v. 25.02 Acres of Land, 495 F.2d 1309 (lOth
Cir. 1974); United States v. Sowards, 370 F.2d 87 (lOth
Cir. 1966).
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or used to support the testimony of the appraisal witness,
Since the Esplin appraisal has heretofore shown
to be defective by lack of comparable sales, rnisinterpreta·
tion of sales (inclusion of water rights on Gardner acreag 1
sales when no water rights were involved), and erroneous a:
surnptions as to water on the State tract, there is no rnark1
data which is reliable.
The Gardner tract is adjacent.

Subdivision work

amounted only to dedication and rough-blading of access roa
Plainly this property is comparable with the State propert)
It is not a comparison of raw land with a sub-division of
city property with utilities, paved roads, sidewalks and
other urban conveniences.
Since Esplin's underlying assumptions, based appar·
ently on information or misinformation supplied by Plaintif
are wrong (water, access and possible usage), the conclusic:
as to value must equally be wrong.
There are only three main ways of establishing lane
value.

These are (1) comparable sales or market value; (2)

costs less depreciation; and (3) capitalization of
proach.

income~

It is apparent that the courts approve the first t<

as the best evidence of value}../ Since the Esplin Appraisal
does not attempt to use either of the other two appraisal
techniques (and we agree that they are inappropriate

Note 2, supra, of Latille v. Housing Authority, 280 A.2c
98 (R.I. 1971); u.s. v. 3,698.63 Acres of Land, 416 F.2c
65 (8th Cir. 1969); State v. O'Neal, 150 So. 2d 608 (Ct.
App. La. 1963)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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8 6~

here) we need not determine whether an attempt has been
made to use only one approach when others might be appropriate.Y
In short, Mr. Esplin has attempted to give an
appraisal based on market value when he has missed critical
physical conditions on the State land relating to water and
to access, and has failed to compare value of an adjacent
tract of land because of misunderstandings as to conditions
of sale of smaller otherwise comparable acreage.

POINT III
IF ARGUENDO, THE COURT CONSTRUED THE STIPULATION
AS AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT AND THE ESPLIN APPRAISAL
AS AN ARBITRATION AWARD, IT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DECLARE THE EXCHANGE AGREEMENT,
OR AT LEAST THE ESPLIN APPRAISAL, VOID.
Section 78-31-16,

u.c.A.

1953, states that an arbitra-

tor's award shall be set aside if the court finds:
(3)
any other misbehavior by which
the rights of any have been prejudiced;
or
(4)
the arbitrators . • • so imperfectly
executed them (i.e. their powers} that a mutual,
final and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
Defendant's motions were supported by the affidavits
of Mark H. Crystal, a professional appraiser (who testified}

~I

Salt Lake County v. Kazura, 22 Ut.2d 313, 452 P,2d 869
(1969).
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and Charles R. Hansen, the former Director of the Division
of State Lands.

A copy of each affidavit is appended to

this brief.
Although the court did not expressly deny said motions, it is implicit in the court's directing the plaintif
to go forward with his proof that the motions were implied!
denied at the commencement of the trial before any evidence
was introduced.

This was error.

In passing on a motion to

vacate an award, where the motion is supported by affidavit
which have not been denied or controverted, the court must
accept as true the facts stated in the affidavits.~
The court received the Esplin appraisal ·into eviden
over Defendant's objection without foundation evidence ofa:
kind, and without testimony from Mr. Esplin.
It is respectfully submitted that, assuming admissibility of the appraisal, that the assumptions stated int
appraisal report are so contrary to the facts in evidence,
that the conclusion as to land value had to be in violatior.
of an arbitrator's duty to ascertain facts and reach a fair
decision based on the facts.

Without restating the argumer

heretofore made, Defendant was not asked to supply in format

Bivans v. Utah Land, Water and Power Co., 53 Utah 60L
174 P. 1126; Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah 442, 15 P.:
353; c. f. Frazier v. Ford Motor Co., 364 Mich. 648, 11.
N.W.2d SO (citing Giannopulos at p. 85).
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to the appraiser.

Plaintiff took it upon himself to

take the appraiser to the site and to either misinform
the appraiser or to avoid giving vital information to the
appraiser.

Under these circumstances, there was a failure

of the "arbitrator" to meet the standards of fairness required by law.
CONCLUSION
T.he Esplin appraisal is insufficient as a matter of
fact and as a matter of law to support its conclusion as to
valuation of the lands sought to be exchanged.

While its

admission into evidence over objection and without testimony
is questionable, its stated assumptions are simply incorrect,
and the ultimate conclusions are therefore not supportable
by the evidence.

The lower court therefore committed error

in relying upon the conclusion.
Appellant prays that the Judgment of the District
Court be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to
properly determine the value of the tracts in question.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
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ss.
County oi Sa 1 t Lake
~l,,RK

For more

H. CRYSTAL. being first duly svmrn, deposes and says:

than 18 years

have been a professional appraiser of lands l'lithin the

State of Utah.

I reside at 1288 North l·iain Street, Farmington, Utah.

am a graduate of Utah State University, Logan, Utah, having

~ajored

in

range management ,.,;th a Bachelor of Science degree in Range l·lcnagement.
I taught vocational agriculture for five years.
rural property appraising.

took forrroal courses in

I am a member of the American Society of Farm

:·lanagers and Rural Appraisers, and also the Utah Society of Farm and Ranch
r·1anagers and Appraisers.

Since l955 I have a8praised nuPJero•Js

ranches in the State of Utah.

I have been a consultant on

farr:~s

r:ing2

a"1d

ar: fr:,.:::":,..

matters for Union Pacific Land Resources Corporation.
During the past 18 years I have appraised more than 1200

~racts

of

land for various agencies of the State of Utah, including the Division of
State Lands.

have also made land appraisals for irrigation companies, and

for various lai·J firms in Utah.

I have been called as an expert witness on

land values and as an appraiser in condemnation cases in courts in Utah.
On August 23, 1g73, I was requested by '.<illiam K. Dinehart, Director
of the Division of State Lands in the Depart".ent of Natural Resources, cf
the State of Utah, to make an appraisal of the market value according to the
highest and best use as of June 10, 1971, of the following described State
land situated in Iron County, State of Utah:
Tm·mship 35 South, Range 9 1/est, Salt Lake i·leridian
Section 33:

iH·Jl.i, W.2iiE 1.:>

(

240.00 acres)

On August 30, 1978, I made a preliminary appraisal of said land and
made a report accordingly to the Division of State Lands, but not a final
appraisal o1·1ing to the fact that on August 30, 1978, I was unable to obtain
any records of comparable sales in the area in relation to the date of
June 10, 1?71.

Conseauently, I made a very conservative preliminary

aoora1sal for the date of June 10, 1971, before making a final appraisal
after : c·Juld Jbta1r in:'"or~ation an:J S'Jpoor::ing information of sales in the
3. rea of
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Fnr
~

CI

·~

~=·I ;.L

In vie•.·/ o7 the fact tnot or• ;}ugT;-r:
nary examination,
the area, 1 based rr,

apf]n"~Jl

tr,~

•)n

c:ssr:c
::t._;:r 1 ·ln.r~onn,

any sales; but ',·Jith a •;ie•,l of further

determine 1·1hat comparable sales actJally

arr: 111/<:-St:;;':.·ror· t<;

,.,:_.,-~ ·:',J~e

o·;::r·

d

pensd of :ir:-:,

. .,ric1 'dOulc 1r~clu~e June l='· 1~71.

Tf1e State lanG in question ·,,as
11irreral rights of any klr·i,

use

11:11 ch the

pro~ertj

bu~

appra1s'?c~

81th all rn1nerals e.xclurjed.

can be put.

used for li'Jestock grazing 1n the past, but I ·.1as infonreJ
cont1guous on :he East of :he State lao;C 'rc1

~E:er.

t'l:.~

lanes

subd1·nde-: ,:-o,- s:.Jrier

horr.e Sites a fev; ;ears a;;o
The subject land is

1:-:...a~e'J

a~out

11 rrnles from

is a county rocd off from the rs-c(:l to Cerjar
to the Dry Lakes area near Snan

about 3!, to 4

~iles

He3.c~.

1-1ith~n

·,.,·r:·c~

200 . . eet of the State land.

rtot able to det:.er:-r1ne

There

Sa1d count; road ?Oe:
~ ..:;ca~e~

This land area h2s

~· 1 ounta1r"

tion, I estimatetj that tr,e ma1n co:...nt_,r roa:j.

:Ja<;

Utah.

Snaii HeJJ i::: .; st:1 .-essr:

farther up canyon frJm th1s land.

been designated as "Sur:-r1i':.

County, comes

Sr<::a~s.

Paro~·1an,

def1n1t~lJ

15

~a~ntal'"'·E·j

On .:I.Jgv_;t >J,

t·; :,..c ..
197~,

l

·.·JhethfC',.. ~here {/as ':.,le'l ,;;n:; :Jubllc

right-of-1·1ay frc.11 ':he :ra1n cJV1t/ roac ever to the S~at-: lar.<:.

On the State "end there are aspe'lS and
a panor-arTic vie'.'' of ?;.r:J',·Jan '/.Jllr:.;.

CJfll""ers r:>r'

--:ne s:•wes

1·nr:~1

-:-her<:> also is a s~,r1rs Sfl tr·.e n0rth-

oarO':ian '.'a:ley.
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gollons per minute.

There is a diligence cla1n of ~re :tate of _":.:_r,

associated '··1ith ~his spring.

The ele•1ation of this land is a~pro:<inately

9500 feet at its highest point.
slopes t01·1ard Summit Creek.
to be 20 inches.

I estimated that 60 percent of this land

lhe a'Jerage annual precipitation is repartee

There is some privately O\·med land aajacent to the

State land on the East, intersected by the r..ain county road.

There is

also a spring on the adjacent land to the East of the subje':t land.
At the time of my preliminary appraisal

•c~ithout

the benecit of sales

made in the area, I concluded that the State land or a substantial portion
thereof while used in the past for grazing purposes, 1r10uld be usable for
summer home sites as 1·1ell as controlled livestock grazing.
returned to Parov1an on September 6, 1978, and reexarined ':he State
land in the lignt of additional information.

I also made 1nquiries as to

subdivisions and sales of subdivided land on the East side of the State
land, in preparation for the final appraisal report for the Division of
State Lands.
I have no personal interest in the subject-matter, and my compensation does not depend on the dollar amount of the appraisal made.
On the 15th day of September, 1978, I obtai ned a certified copy of
the minutes of a meeting of the Board of County Commissioners of Iron
County, Utah, held April 14, 1971, •.·1hich recites under the caption of
SUBDIVISIOrl:
l~r. llatt Bulloch, Cedar City Engineer, met "ith the Board
and presented the following subdivision plats for approval:

2. Green ~·!eado'o'l Acres, Units 2, 1ocated in and being a
part of Section 33, T<~p. 35 South, Range 9 \/est, SLB&I·!.
The Corr.missioners, observing that the "OK" of the Planning
CofTirnission, the County Engineer, and the County Attorney, had
heretofore been obtained; by 1'·lotion duly passed, 1·1hich 'rJas maGe by
Commissioner Ivan~~. Matheson, and seconded by Commissioner D.
Robinson, granted their approval subject, ho~rJever, to access on
subdivision nuober 2, being 1·1idened to fifty feet.
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t

of the

S~ate

access

~-~

lan:r J.nd the

.s:·.

of
~'le

33, (1·1hlcn adJolnS on the South siCe Jf

SL:<e lane), cs ·..-l 1 1 ::.s :ne

of Section 31, To•::nship JS Sout:l, Pun9e 9 ,_..rest, Salt
From inquiries made of p-=·Jple in

~arJ';IJn

La~.e

>'.;:.iJi:J.'l

Jr-: Cedor Cit:- l_'tah, par-_:c.,.

larly from and after Septembel' 6, 1978, I le:Jrr.ej that tr.ere had
numtet of sales of land on contract 't1hich

did not find

s~:es

a

in

u-~

,..,.:

found that sales hac! beer,

of the County Recor·der of Iron Cuunty, Utah.
of privately ov1red lands for surrr.;er horne

be~'l

rec:~-d~-:J

and for

recr--::::.~ion::!l

1·1ithin an area of a haif mile t0 the East and vtitflin a 1-,alf

ii'~le

uses,

to :r,e 5"·,·

of the aforesaid State land.
ha·:e not been able to ascer-tain all of the sales filade in those

SOiile of the sales hav1ng
lands~.-·

be~n

ar~:;s

made in areas 1·1hich beca[T]e s·Jbc!blsions cf

,Jr in dBtacter to tile State land.

The follm1ir.g

sales ·.·1n1ch I have been able to identify to date, rrcde in

c~r·e

-::h~

or nearly adjacent to the State land hereinabove described.

sor:1e of

~h:;

areas adjacen·
rn 1'10ne of

tr·,:;

sales which I l'las able to identify '(las there any sale of 1r1ater rights:
A.

On or about June 30, 1959, qobert L. Gardner, Trustee, sold under

1-1ritten contract to .A.lma D. Jones and Beulah :-1. Jones, of ParO':tan, Utah, a
tract of 8.04 acres for the sum of $4,964.70, the purchase price of s0id
3.04 acres a1nounted to $617.50 per acre, described as follo1·1s:
Commencing at a point ilorth 1170.95 feet and ':'lest 959.93
feet from the South quarter corner of Section 33, Tovmshio 35
South, Pgnge 9 fiest, Salt Lake :~eridian, aod r8nning thence
South 89 37' East 97§.15 feet; thence llorth I 28' fiest 3EJ.Ol
feet: thence South 89 59' \·lest 969.51 feet; thence South 0
353.10 feet along an old fence to the point cf beginning.
(',,li~hin
a third of a mile from the South boundar"y of

~he

also learned that 1·1ithin the past year a S'Jrrrr.er

State land).
ho~e

has been pal'-

tially construct<::d on said land so purchaseJ, although the contract
yet been paid in f Jll.·
1

1-j::_::

I am alsc informed that a rough roar:i v:as c·J: fr:-

the county road by a bulldozer

sh:Jrt~y

after the

purcha~e

·.-. as "":3Ge, an1
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than one daj to cut.
S.

3; •.-1ritten contrac;: da'l.ed

~·Jr.e 3~·.

'1359, said Po:-2rt L. Garc!n'2r'

as Trustee, sold to Clarence L. Stutbs and Ce:Jnn Stubbs, his 1·1ife, 5.73
acres of land in Green

l~ead0\·1

South, Range 9 \·lest, Salt Lake

Acres, Unit I, in Section 33, To•.mship 35
l~eridian,

in Iron County, State of Utah, for

the sum of 53,737.50, amounting to $652.25 per acre.

Said land is east:rl

from the State land.

C.

By 1·1ritten contract on or about September 30, 1969, scid Robert

L. Gardner as Trustee, sold to James D. .'·lontgomery and

l~ary

A. i·1ontqor.Jery,

his l'life, a tract of 5 acres for the sum of 53,250.00 or S650.00 per acre,
the follooling described tract of land situated in Iron County,

Sta~e

of

Utah:
Beginning at a point North 0° 19' f/est 942.64 feet from the
Southeast corner of Section 33, T01-mship 35 Sou~h, Range 9 ':Jest,
Salt Lake Meridian, gnd running thence South 89 59' •,:es: 538.83
feet; thence >'!orth 4 58' East 138.13 feet; thence along
915.47
foot radius curve to the left 122 50 feet; thence North 2 42'
Hest l5iJ.l8 feet; thence North 89° 59' East 529.33 feet; thence
South 0 19' East 413 feet to the point of beginning. (Said land
is less than a half mile southerly from the State land.)

8

D.

By •.-witten contract dated •'larch 10, 1971, Green l·lead0\·1 Acres, a

partnership, by Ben A. Baldl'lin, Partner, sold to Howard L. Stubbs and
Elna H. Stubbs, his wife, as joint tenants, for the purchase price of
S4,400.00, Lots 16 and 17 in Block 0, of Green

~leado>~

Acres, in Section

33, Toomship 35 South, Range 9 •,.Jest, Salt Lake i·!eridian,

>~hich

land consist'

of 5.42 acres or $811.80 per acre.
E.

By written contract dated August 14, 1972, Green l·lead01·1 Acres,

a partnership, sold to 1/illiam L. Hardy and Shannon A. Hardy, his l'life,
Lot 6 of Block B, Unit I, and Lot 2 of Block C of Unit II, totaling 1.619
acres for a purchase price of $4,800.00 or $2,964.78 per acre.

Said land

is •t~ithin Green 1•1eadmts Acres, Units I and II, in Section 33, Township 35
South, Range 9 •,.Jest, Salt Lake i·leridian.

According to my calculations, said

land is 1·1ithin one-half mile from the East line of the State land.
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;:: ~

General's

.

of~1ce

.

,'"'

t·1at 21.: le2st c

to dvr:est1C US2.

dence 1n

.'

~cr·:

l1tu~a~10n

elsev1here in

en o7 said '•··a"c:er

~;,e :later'

·:ot·:n'thStJndlnS

1 1

~ ta".

\!':'U:·J ·;,we

c-::Jl~

~),

t:J

riJ

".as lr.c,::atec: th-'!::.

names 1n the rrounto in a teas do no: use Tore

~.'lon

:::

crJn.·-:··>'
·::·:::2 _,_

s,nr,~cr

: !JQ a a 11 on-:. o.:

obn;:; ~·
':12. ~er

pc··

c!ay on an average; :hat one gallon of fl0\11 per· minute 3r'ount:s to l,..!..lQ
gallons per day, so that four g3llons ;:er r"'lnute

'Jt'

1 ·2s:,

:"o.r~

reputed flO\'J of the spnng on tf:e State 1-=.'lG, if con·Jer ..ced

~o

')r~.::-~.a~f

-::'":~

:c.~e::;t1C

use, \·1ould be sufficient to sup;:.tl; j7 s·J:-::.-;;er cab1ns or hor1es, '::;'

1-]2·;~nr:

s:on'='2 >:anks at -::he nighest elevation of use
There are aspens and

coni~~rs

on tne St?te larC:, ·,,hic.'l .Taf-e it

desiri:ltlo:- r7;:,r surr,i'er hOTTieS and ::aJ1r-.s ar.d for recreil.tlon.J.l us.::
the 'J<::oc-.e in ParO\·Jcn reported

t'lc~

sno•..·mob1l1n~ on that area

in pop•J?arity as a 1.-r:nter· recreaticn in addition tc

s~1in9

a:

~on,e

~-<as

cf

1ncre~s~·:

~n·an

.--ieaj

farther up canyon.

The l-1arket Data 3.pproach

util~zes

sales of cxr'pdrable propenj

estimate the value of +:he subject propert:t.
aopraised and the

Data

est~ITated

ihe sutJect

proper~:;

value per acre c!et:E:"""T'lne-: by 'JSlng tr'le

~:J

has ':e="
~.'ariet

~pproach.

The subject pro~erty consists of a s:-ooth ar-~a and a slopin~ are~

which slooes

~~,est·. . ar-:J.

-:-he appraisal clas:;·,fl·~=

the su~:cc~ ~r~:;;n_.
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st~ep

and gr::!d•J.;I s1ooing lc.r.c

co"'lpare 1·1ith the 140 acr<?s.

,ne ai):Jr·alset- ::as

'Jne:bl~

Therefore, a range value for

to

lao·:.~

t;raz~ng

dec.·.:-

only ''1as

assigned to the 140 acres.
ft.creage values of land in the proximity of the subject ;::>roperty
indiCate a continued up1·1ard trend.
On the basis of the :-larket Oata Approach in

esti~ating

the value of

the subject property, and giving full consijere.tion to tile foregoing
facts and after analysis of the comparable lanes described, it is tre
opinion of the appraoser that the 11arkec Value of the State land on June
10, 1971 VJas as follo1·1S:
$500.00 per acre

$50,000.00

S 60.00 per acre

s 8,400.00

Total Estimated '/alue

$58.400.00

l 00 acres
140 acres

@

Subscribed and sworn before me this 19th day of September, 1978.

r~y Cor.Jni~sion

Expires:

ll-27-81
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AIT!DAVI':' OF C?J.RL=:s R. HAti5~, Itl C!V!L

::o.

:ss.
COU!CY OF S~L': LAKE )

C!!A!U.SS R.

1.

W~SEN,

6666, in the District Court o!' Iron County, Utah
being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

I reside in Salt Lake County, Utah.

Bar, engaged in the practice of law.

am a member of the Utah State

For over ten years prior to July l, 19?8,

I was the duly appointed, qualified and acting Director of the Division of State
Lands, Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah.

I

Bl!l

the Charles R.

?.ansen who was named as a defendant in the capacity as Director of the Division

of State Lands in Civil No. 6666 in which D. Robinson was plaintiff, and the
State of Utah, Department of Natural Resources, Division of State Lands, was the
principal defendant, in the District Court of Iron County, State of Utah.
suit was filed in November 1974.
inception.

Said

I becar::1e familiar with said suit from its Yery

am familiar with the controversies which preceded said suit:

The

claim that D. Robinson was entitled to obtain title to State trust fund land in
Iron County, Utah, consisting of the NWl' and Y/l'.m:l. of Section 33, Township 35
South, Range 9 West, Salt Lake Meridian, without payment of any money to the
State, but merely by exchanging land consisting of Lots l, 2, 3 and 4, and the
SYzN'/7 of Section l, '!'ownship 33 South, Range 19 West, Salt Lake Meridian, without any valid appraisal of the State land for its highest and best use.
2.

I

BD

not familiar with either parcel of land.

Beginning sometime

in 1970, D. Robinson had a number of conversations with me about the subject
State land which is trust fund land.

On at least two occasions he appeared

be!ore the Board of State Lands, asking that an exchange be consummated.

S:e

spoke to me in my office at tlle State Capitol Building between 1970 and 1973.
He told me that he was o.uite familiar with the State land in question, and that
it had no other value except as grazing land.

Lands under grazing leases pro-

duc~~n most cases the lowest income of any lands held under State leases.
In 1971 Paul E. Reimann, assistant attorney general, was assigned to do the
legal work for the Division of State Lands.

With his approval I had changes I!IB.de

in .5tate grazing leases to contain a clause that the gra1.ing lease could be
ter:::inated at the end o: any year.

~hat

wa.s to enable the Division of State

l..a.."'!:is to obtain other leases providi!'lg greater revenue than grazing leases, also

to sell tte sur!"ace estate a:ter appraisal of the su::"face estate for the
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highest and best use, and o'ttai::. the h:,r.est cc:::t:etitive b1::! 1:" e-::L:<!:..

~

......

excess of the appraised marKet value, i: other11ise acceptable.

3.

During

e~y

adl:l.inistration as Director of the :>1visio:J. o!'" State lands,

there were a number of instances when individuals and even State age!lcies
applied for State lands for less than the appraised value for the highest and
best use.

fo'..r. neimann orally and in writing counseled that the D:vision of .State

Lands &ll:i the 3oard of State Lands have the highest duties of care of trust fun1
lands and the duty to obtain the hi;hest revenue and in case o! transfer o! title,
the highest value which would have to be not less than the appraisal of the land
for its hi'-hest and best use, not for its lowest possible use.

',/e turned down

proposals made by State legislators and by State officials and State agencies.
Mr. Rei!tlann and I relied on the 1967 decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Lassen v. Arizona, ex rel Arizo!le. :-!.ighway Dent.,

385 U• .3. 458.

:n

that case the Arizona :-:ig:hway Department souc;ht to condemn State trust fund land
for highway construction without payment of MY

cot:~pensation

to the trust fund

under the theory that State highways constructed across trust fund lan:.s always

The Supreme Court of Arizona ruled

enhanced the values of the trust fund lands.
in favor of the !!ighway Departcent.

However, the Supreme Court of the United

States reversed the Arizona Supreme Court and held that no trust fund lands could
be sold for less than its appraised value, and that any other disposition would
be a breach of trust.

In a 1919 decision

the Supreme Cou:-t of the United

States in Ervien v. United States, 251 U. S. 41, declared that actual compensation
in money must be paid to the trust equaling the appraised value.
4.

Some time after complaints were oade to the Attorney General by people

in Iron County that there were irregularl..ties in the atte!!l?ts of D. Robinso!l to
obtain the State land in question for land he acquired as tax title land, s~id
Paul E. Reimann, as assista"lt attorney general, was assigned by the Attorr.ey
General to conduct an investigation of the co:n':llaints and to ascertain whether
there had been compliance with the State statutes relatint; to exchanGes of State
lands and the decisions o! the courts.

I know that after co:1si-:!erable ti:Je ar.d

effort to get the facts, during whi::~ he con:erre::l wit;>) me on n'J"'erc'Js occaslcr.s,
he advised l:le

as

rh!"ector t:'1at t!'le:-e neve:;

land fo!' lts hi€hest and best use,

9:.-:

ha::!

bee:1 a:.:1

a':':l:"::!.isa:;.

o:' ":.~.e

State

':hat ":::.e re::-'!.se:-.':~":.:0:1.'3 -:d.e '::l -::e ::::.-

~. Robinsor: to the e::ect t!-:at the St2':e lar.d :-.a: r.c v::.:..t.:e ex~<:>::":. a~. F!'"3::.ln;
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(:_;

ll:l.nd, were contrary to the facts discovered by Mr. Reimann in the cou::-se of
investigation.

~is

He also advised that because the Robinson land was involved in

litigation with a lis pendens on record, that the title was not carketable, in

the fall of 1973 and also in January 1974.

After suit was filed, from the in-

vestigation made by Mr. Reimann, I became aware of the fact that privately owned
lands on the easterly side of the State land had been sold prior to and subsequent
to 1970 for sumer home sites.
5.

I

was in court as a defendant in my capacity of Director of the

Division o! State Lands on April 5, 1978, when Civil No.6666 was called for
trial.

After opening statements of legal counsel, the Court held a conference

in cha!Dbers.

The Court reco:n:nended that counsel con!er to see if' they could

resolve the dispute.

was present during those con!'erences.

There was a discus-

sion on a proposal to have the lands separately appraised by a CO[!Ipetent professiot.al appraiser.

~r.

a.~d

Reir..ann stated that the State land is trust fund land

would have to be appraised for its highest and best use market value.
recom.:nended Mark H. Crystal.

it

:r.e

Michael W. Park, attorney for D. Robinson, left the

conference to confer with his client.

When he returned he told us :I. Robinson

would not consent to having Mr. Crystal act as appraiser.
D. Robinson recommended Ken Esplin of Cedar City.

Y.r.

Mr. Park said that

~ei!!iann

said he was not

acquainted with Mr. Esplin, but he was uneasy about having any one from Cedar
City act as appraiser because he was fearful that D. Robinson would be over to
Cedar City to campaign Tri th Mr. Esplin to have the State land appraised

o~ly

as

valual:lle for ' 1 grazing"; that Mr. Robinson had irgued that the State land had
been ''horribly overgrazed 11 and not worth as much as the ?.obinson land; and Pr.
Reimann said he knew from his investigation conducted for the Attorney General's
office that the State land was valuable for summer home sites in a scie.r:.ic area
not far from Brian Head.

Mr. Park said we should not worry about Mr. Esplini

that he was sure 1-~. Esplin would ap?raise all lands at their highest and best
use market value and not be inflUenced by
6.
.,.35

a.~y

one.

VIi th that state!:'lent from ~r. Park as attorney for P.r. Robinson, it

stated th3.t ~~r. :tei:-12.Iln should not object to Ken Esplin.

P.r. Rei:!!a."ln said

t!'lat before mal-:inc- the appraisals ~r. Esplin shoul1 be furnished with a copy of
the writte:1 sti~ulntion to be si~ned by l<::!?al counsel, defir..inz the duty to
<.:--na::.se sep.o~:"a":.e~:t

each tract accor1::.:1;; to its hi~hest and best use as o! JU!'.e
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F!o':ir.soi:. land, as rec_uested by

~~r.

?obi.nson.

.So::e'::-.ir.g

~_s

sa:.d about l::.::i ~l.!lt;

the tice in which D. Robinson would have to pay the difference tc the State of
Utah for the difference in a:J;>raised value of the State land over the Robinson land.

?.

After the con:ference of cou:'lsel, after the noon recess, P.r. Park the:J

dictated into the record a stipulation, but he ooitted some itei::S IJ;'hich haC. been
a~eed

on orally.

~r.

Rei!!:ann ti".en dictated into the record the items

o::~itted.

~r.

?ark said he would prepare the stipulation.

Park had

form of stipulation

submitted by

~~ichael

not cover everything agreed on orally.

w~ic!".

Vr.

The written

W. Park as attorney for plaintiff, di::l.

Y.r. Reir.lann prepared a form o:f written

stipulation dated April 24, 19?0, r.hich I a;>p:-oved and it was signed by counsel
and a copy was :::led in the State Land Office.

8.

About the middle of June, 1978, about two weeY.s before my resi~tion

as Director of the Division of State Lands became effective, I received a report
of a telephone conversation Paul E. Reimann had received from Robert L. Gardner,
assistant attorney general in Cedar City, indicating that Ken Esplin ha::l. not
valued the State land for any use except for grazing.
the appraisal report of Ken Esplin

I did not see a copy of

until the past several days.

I discussed with

Mr. Reimann the question of filing a Clotion to declare the appraisal.s invalid and
contrary to law; but Mr. Heimann requested that we wait to see if D. Robinson
paid to the State of Utah the C.i!ferential, as he had only 30 C.ays, eL"ld if he
failed to pay, the exchans-e would become null and void, a.:l.d there would be no need
hi~hest

to raise o'tjections to the failure to appraise the State land for its

and

best use.
9.

While I was surprised when

~r.

Rei!:la.D.n reported on the telephone con-

versation with Jrol.r. Gardner a'!:lout the middle of June 1978, which indicated that
the State land had not been appraised for a.:oy value except !or grazing, I was
more surprised

whe~.

several da:·ts ago I read a copy o!

report dated l-':ay 26, 1978.

Y.en E:.splin

a~';")raisal

I notice:i th.3.t he rep::-esented or. pa;::e 2 that ,:'his

aopraisal has been ~a:.e !roo caps, legal desc::-iptio~s,
oro"Jerty O?.'!le:"."

t~e

a::-:

C.<:. ta :>..::-:-.:s:::ed t·.· :1...~

All lnfo:;;.Jat::.on :ro!:: the State La:1d O!!ice v.:--::(:1": :r..as

3tate l.rust fund lan:is, hE..S tc ce cha."lneled th.rou~!'. the J:recto:-.

c~ar'7-e

o!

:;: rC.~ow '::;.at
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anY

ca~aci ty

at any title ri th respect to

t~e

5 tate la.."ld. in q1.:.es ticn.

!u:t~er=or!,

during the years I served as Director of the Division cf State Lands, ;:-a::ing-.

was considered the lowest tjpe of use, but lands which were val.uable !or 'ouil:!.in;
sites, i.D,dustrial sites and !or other uses, frequen:ly were leased for gra.:.ing

until the Board saw !it to dispose of the surface for the highest and best uses
to which the land could be devoted.
10.

t~at

T!le !act

a particular tract has been allo,.,ed to '""

a grazing lease, does not establish its highest and bes<t; use.

grazing · some

~ed

under

Nor does over-

tract o! land valuable for farm land or for home sites or

industrial sites, render such lands useless for far1 land, for home si tea including

su:~Cer

home sites or for industrial uses.

Furtht.•rmore, the descriptio!l of

the State land as having slopes, even steep slopes, which

mi~t

be

;:~"'r

gra:in!'

ground, might suggest that the land has substantial value as home sites including
summer home sites by reason of view.

Furthermore, it is common lalowledge,

tha~

in construction of homes, whether in a city or in the mountaiAS, the land is

scarred and graded, so even i! there is only limited grazing nlue, that does
not affect the values for higher and best uses to which the land can be adapted,
I am aware of the fact that many expensive homes have been built on tho foothills
around Salt Lake City r.hich were poor grazing lands.

I note too, that •hilo Mr.

!:splin recognized that there was subdivision development to the east of tho State
I

land, he did not bother to state the infon:>ation on sales of lands comparable to
the State land in 0 uestion.
Read, a ski resort.

He stated that the State land is not far from ilrian

I know that there ·~ a considerable amount of opposition to

the attempts of D. Robinson to get the State land on a trade for grazing land
in tb.e western part of Iron County, among people in Iron County, because claim

•as made that the State land was valuable for summer home sitos, being only about
ll miles from Parowan.

I, as the Director, and members o! the Board of State

Lands, recognized our duties to exercise the highest duty of care fer State Trust
Fund lands, and not dispose of them !or less than the appraised value !or their
highest and best uses.

~he Esplin report contradicts the facts, and I regard

it as incompetent and in disregard of law dealing with trust fund lands in Utah.

Su~acribed a.":d

'':r co;-:lS$:c:: e~i::-es
'I· . n l - ~ ,.

S':'l"O:':J.

to before r.-:e t::Us 29t~ C.ay of Septe~ber, 1976.
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S\··':J··r. r-:::scs

of Jt.;ly. l97e. maSe repeated

ina~o:1n12s

in the

8i·:~.sior. o~

scy~

2.:1:

Stc:e Lands to

cscerta1n l'.'he:ner or no: C. Robinson or anyone or, his be he: 7, a: any

sent a cneck cr cr.y surr c7 rnoney
Division of State Lands in
1n

Civ~.1

2.~"~Y

t~

tir.~e

nc:c'

:ne 8oarC of S:ate :..ands or to tne

surr• or amoun:

~·:~tn

respec: -cc S:a:e

~anc

~nv::.;·,c:

7io. 666E in Iron County, Utah.

l have mede an investigation of the records of this office,
receipts o.; mor.ey and also

~ne

recor'ds of the suspense

accoun~.

incl~.:C/.ns

:~o

cheer n;:, ...

any deoosi: in any sum or amount \,·as rr:ade in any sum or afTIOunt fror said
C:.

~obinson

or frofT' anyone on nis behc:1f, during the period of

t..~ ... i1

1972 :o

the present date.

Suts:ribed and S\·Jorn before me this 22nd day of September, 1972 .

.-,_

. _.. _

r ;·/~

L-

i~atary

Puc·1ic, resiCinola::
Sa1t Lake City, Utah -

·y Cormiss10r Expires:

10-1-81
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